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The Brady Rule May Hurt the Innocent
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Mandatory disclosure of evidence (the so-called Brady rule) is considered to be among
the most important bulwarks against prosecutorial misconduct. While protecting the
generality of defendants in the criminal process, we show that under certain reasonable
assumptions this procedural mechanism may hurt innocent defendants by inducing
prosecutors to adjust their behavior to their detriment. The main rationale for our thesis
is that, if forced to reveal exculpatory information, the prosecutor might not look for that
information in the first place, and in turn this could harm the innocent under certain
reasonable conditions. We extensively discuss our results in the context of the economic
literature on criminal procedure. (JEL K14, K41, K42)
1. Introduction
In modern legal systems, criminal procedure is usually biased toward the
interests of defendants (Hylton and Khanna, 2007). The mechanisms of
criminal procedure are multiple and encompass, inter alia, the determination
of factual evidence, the interpretation of substantive law, the role of the judge
vis-à-vis the prosecutor and the defendant, and the possibility of appealing to
the highest court. These mechanisms enrich a menu of tools that each legal
system can deploy in order to tilt to different degrees the procedure toward
the interests of defendants. In this paper, we focus on mandatory disclosure
of exculpatory evidence (the so-called Brady rule). We argue that the Brady
rulemay have a counterintuitive effect on the prosecutor’s choice of enforce-
ment technology. The search for more accurate evidence could be
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undermined by the Brady rule because the prosecutor loses the exclusive
property rights over the information.1 Such a strategic adjustment may have
important consequences for the quality of convictions, welfare of innocents,
and overall criminal deterrence.
In order to qualify our claim, consider the following examples of the
adverse consequences that may arise from the application of the Brady
rule.
Example 1: Exculpatory evidence leaked from within the prosecutorial of-
fice. Suppose the defendant claims that he was not at the crime’s scene when
it was committed. Unknown to the defendant, the crime has been recorded by
surveillance cameras from the bank next door. The prosecutor, who believes
he is guilty, can ask the bank for the recorded tapes. The prosecutor has to
assess the benefits of using new (perhaps incriminating) evidence against the
costs of jeopardizing the odds of prosecution (if the evidence is exculpatory
and has to be disclosed). Of course, if the prosecutor were not bound to dis-
close exculpatory evidence, she would not hesitate to look at the recorded
tapes in the hope of finding incriminating proofs. Once this evidence exists,
there is a possibility that the defendant gains access to it because somebody
in the prosecutorial office, moved by moral regret, personal rivalry, or eco-
nomic returns, leaks it to the defendant’s lawyers.
Example 2: Exculpatory evidence is produced by the defendant’s attorney
observing the prosecutor’s behavior. Suppose we deal with a serious finan-
cial crime. The evidence collected thus far may be enough for the prosecutor
to win the case. Moreover, she could have access to some financial state-
ments in foreign bank accounts that would provide evidence of further
crimes. There is a risk nevertheless; the financial statements might show
no other crime and instead provide exculpatory evidence. Because of the
Brady rule, the prosecutor might abstain from asking foreign banking insti-
tutions to produce such financial statements. At the same time, an innocent
defendant would want the prosecutor to pursue this line of investigation for
further evidence. In fact, although the prosecutor may withhold any excul-
patory evidence that could emerge, the defendant could benefit, for instance,
1. In that sense, our result follows the information literature where mandatory dis-
closure may lead to too little investment in the acquisition of information in the first place
(Shavell, 1994; Polinsky and Shavell, 2006).
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by simply observing the prosecutor’s search strategy and learning where to
look for evidence to his own advantage.
Example 3: Exculpatory evidence is produced by the media pressing the
prosecutor. Suppose now a prosecutor is investigating an important politi-
cian for corruption against which the evidence seems strong. There is the
possibility that certain confidential documents could provide the ultimate
evidence to convict the politician. However, those same confidential docu-
ments might instead provide exculpatory evidence. Under the Brady rule,
the prosecutor has no strong incentive to search for those confidential docu-
ments. Without the Brady rule, the prosecutor might be willing to take the
risk. If she finds some exculpatory evidence, the prosecutor may not disclose
it voluntarily as she might be ultimately convinced of the politician’s cor-
ruption or simply she might only care about obtaining the conviction. How-
ever, the press might inevitably report on the actions taken by the prosecutor
or pressure her to explain any inconsistency in her prosecutorial strategies
and therefore leak the existence of such evidence and thus help the case of
the innocent politician accused of corruption. Notice that, although the ev-
idence is brought upon by the press, the prosecutor has produced it in the first
place.
The examples encompass multiple types of crimes, varieties of evidence
collected, different motivations of the prosecutor, and several methods by
which the exculpatory evidence may nevertheless reach the defendant even
without mandatory disclosure. However, in all these examples, the Brady rule
discourages investigative activities that benefit defendants. The prosecutor
who feels strongly about the case may give up searching for further evidence,
fully discounting the occurrence that more investigation may end up jeopard-
izing her case by uncovering exculpatory evidence. Conversely, without man-
datory disclosure the prosecutor discounts this occurrence only by a certain
probability. In fact, evidence may be collected and, if exculpatory, be with-
held. However, with some probability, it could be leaked to the defendant.
Our main insight is that if the prosecutor is induced to investigate more in
the absence of the Brady rule, then exculpatory information may leak and
benefit the innocent. More generally, one could say that prosecutors often
have some exculpatory evidence anyway. Without the Brady rule, all excul-
patory evidence can be hidden (including what they have from the beginning
of the investigation). For the Brady rule to disadvantage innocent people, the
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loss of all exculpatory evidence has to be less important than the benefit of
new exculpatory evidence that can be leaked. There are many reasons to
think this is a reasonable assumption under some conditions.
Withholding exculpatory evidence usually requires a conspiracy of the
prosecutor with third parties (enforcement agencies, private parties, etc.).
The more extensive the conspiracy is, the more likely leaking is to take place.
Other procedural safeguards, such as the defendant’s right to call witnesses
who could be third parties in the investigation, help undermine a strong con-
spiracy. At the same time, actions taken by the prosecutor are observed by
the defendant’s lawyer in many occasions and they could potentially reveal
the extent to which she is hiding evidence. Finally, many cases attract the
interest of other parties such as the press that inevitably disadvantages the
prosecutor in eliminating exculpatory evidence.
The original case that set the Brady rule is an example of how exculpatory
evidence can leak despite the effort by the prosecutor to hide it.2 What this
example also shows is that, in the absence of mandatory disclosure, excul-
patory evidence may take time to emerge and, in particular, may well emerge
only after a defendant has been tried, at which time presumably it can no
longer significantly help him. Therefore, our insight should apply to a par-
ticular subset of cases for which we think revelation of withheld evidence by
the prosecutor that directly benefits the defendant is likely.
We do not claim that the Brady rule always hurts the innocent. Quite the
opposite; we show that, in some cases, the Brady rule helps all defendants.
However, we argue that, under certain specific conditions, the mandatory
disclosure of evidence hurts innocent defendants and helps guilty defend-
ants. The novelty of our paper is to provide conditions under which the
Brady rule is detrimental to innocent defendants, a point so far neglected
in the literature. Let us be clear about the fact that our argument does
not offer support of the abolishment of the Brady rule. In fact, since we
identify specific circumstances under which the Brady rule is detrimental,
2. Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83, 1963). The case was about a murder trial in
which the petitioner admitted participating in the crime but claimed that his accomplice
did the actual killing. The petitioner was convicted, and his appeal was denied. It was later
discovered that the prosecutor in the case had withheld a written statement by the peti-
tioner’s accomplice in which the accomplice confessed to doing the actual killing—but
only years after the trial.
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the main implication of our model is that the Brady rule should be more
carefully applied when those specific circumstances arise, and therefore it
is important to develop legal policies to decrease the likelihood that those
specific circumstances arise.
In the model, a defendant is either innocent or guilty. Not knowing the
defendant’s type, and given all the available evidence to date, the prosecutor
chooses either to (i) drop the case; (ii) prosecute the case passively (i.e., pro-
ceed with only the evidence available to date); or (iii) prosecute the case ac-
tively (i.e., gather additional evidence and proceed). If the prosecutor actively
prosecutes the case, she receives additional evidence that is either incriminat-
ing or exculpatory. If the prosecutor passively prosecutes the case, the defen-
dant is convicted with some probability between zero and one. If she actively
prosecutes the case and receives additional incriminating evidence, she shares
it with the court and the defendant is convicted with probability one. If she
actively prosecutes the case and receives additional exculpatory evidence, the
outcome depends on whether or not the Brady rule is in effect. If the Brady
rule is in effect, the additional exculpatory evidence is shared with the court
and the defendant is acquitted with probability one. If it is not in effect, the
prosecutor hides the additional exculpatory evidence; however, it is assumed
that the additional exculpatory evidence may nonetheless leak to the court
once it has been produced. Thus, the probability that the defendant is con-
victed is lower than in the absence of producing such evidence.
We assume that the prosecutor chooses her prosecutorial strategy to max-
imize its payoff. She incurs a cost for prosecuting the case and an additional
cost for prosecuting the case actively. She derives a benefit from a conviction,
the benefit being higher when the defendant is guilty and lower when the
defendant is innocent. Under certain conditions, the Brady rule can induce
the prosecutor to switch from prosecuting actively to prosecuting passively,
and thereby it may increase the probability that an innocent defendant is
convicted. Intuitively, without a rule of mandatory disclosure, the prosecutor
may want to produce additional evidence even if it already has a pretty strong
case against the defendant because if the additional evidence turns out to be
incriminating, she can use it to bolster the case against the defendant even
further and if it turns out to be exculpatory, she has some chance of prevent-
ing it from leaking, in which case it will not weaken her case. However, with
a rule of mandatory disclosure, if she already has a pretty strong case against
the defendant, she may prefer not to produce additional evidence because
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now, if it turns out to be exculpatory, it must be disclosed and this will
weaken her case. Thus, without the Brady rule, the additional evidence
may be produced, and once it is produced, it may leak, in which case
the innocent can benefit from it. But with a rule of mandatory disclosure,
the evidence will not be produced, in which case it has no chance of helping
the innocent. In these circumstances, the Brady rule can increase the prob-
ability that an innocent defendant is convicted.
In the first section of the present work, we review the literature on the
behavior of prosecutors. In the following section, we discuss some of the
more important pro-defendant mechanisms and we focus on the kind of
errors they generate. In the fourth section, we lay down our model that com-
bines self-interested prosecutors with mandatory disclosure of exculpatory
evidence. Our main goal is to show, in a simple model, that the procedural
safeguard that is supposed to be in place in order to protect defendants may
end up hurting the subset of accused that are in fact innocent. In the fifth
section, we assess some possible limitations of the model and legal policy
implications. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. What the Prosecutor Is up to
Early works in law and economics assumed that the judiciary pursues the
general interest of society. In his account of courts, Landes (1971) modeled
prosecutors as individuals who maximize the expected number of convic-
tions weighted by the length of conviction. This objective function, Landes
then argued, coincides with the social optimum as long as one assumes that
sentences correspond to the expected prices society charges for the related
crimes. Most of the models in the stream of literature on optimal law
enforcement3 are built on the assumption that prosecutors, together with
the judiciary, behave benevolently; that is to say, they second a social
welfare-maximizing goal—whether this is optimal deterrence (Becker,
1968), absolute deterrence (Posner, 1985; on the distinction between Becker
and Posner, see Hylton, 2005), retribution (Kahan, 1998), or victim compen-
sation (Fletcher, 1995)—in enforcing criminal law, therefore making appro-
priate use of criminal procedure.
3. For comprehensive surveys of the literature, see Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky
and Shavell (2000).
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On the other hand, legal scholars have long pointed out the discrepancies
between the idealistic stereotype of the benevolent judiciary and the reality of
trials and prosecution. To begin with, prosecutors have tremendous discretion
over the reputation, liberty, and life of individuals (Jackson, 1940). Obvi-
ously, discretion need not necessarily be a problem in itself; Easterbrook
(1983), for instance, assumes that prosecutors use their discretion to
optimally screen cases that maximize deterrence given their budget con-
straints. However, this latter view might be naive or quite unrealistic, as pros-
ecutors discretion is certainly open and often prone to abuses (Wright, 2005;
Garoupa and Stephen, 2008). For example, Schulhofer (1988) argues that, as
self-interested agents, prosecutors decisions naturally diverge from those that
would be made in the interest of the public. Prosecutors may pursue other
goals such as salary and further career advances (see, among others,
Christensen, 1981; Glaeser, Kessler, and Morrison Piehl, 2000; Boylan,
2005; Long and Boylan, 2005; Garoupa, 2009) as well as reelection (Gordon
and Huber, 2002). These other goals are often parameterized on the record of
convictions (Meares, 1995), which is a very imperfect measure of the per-
formance of the justice system. Furthermore, other factors may misalign
the incentives of the prosecutor such as risk aversion (Albonetti, 1987) or
simply the different weight they attribute to the social costs of false positives
(Hylton and Khanna, 2007). Miceli (1990) notes how the same prosecutorial
goals set forth by William Landes in his seminal article do not match with
societal goals once one includes the possibility of erroneous convictions.4
In fact, the persistent and systematic misalignment of prosecutorial incen-
tives vis-à-vis societal goals has lead Hylton and Khanna (2007) to formulate
a public choice theory of criminal procedure that justifies pro-defendant safe-
guards as necessary second-best constraints to impede prosecutorial agency
problems. We discuss some of these safeguards in the following section.
3. Mandatory Disclosure in Criminal Procedure
Criminal procedure supports courts efforts to sort out factually innocent
from truly guilty defendants. Given the risk that some innocents may end up
4. For a model that includes prosecutorial concern for false positives, see Baker and
Mezzetti (2001) and also Rasmusen, Manu, and Mark (2009).
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convicted and the fact that not all guilty individuals are necessarily detected
and brought to court as defendants (and even if they are, their responsibilities
may not be proven in court), criminal procedure struggles to achieve two
somewhat conflicting goals: on the one hand, the achievement of greater
accuracy in adjudication (Kaplow, 1994) in absolute terms and, on the other
hand, the struggle to wrongfully convict as few innocents as possible.
The presumption of innocence, which is a cornerstone of all procedures
of modern democracies5 both in common law6 and in civil law countries,7
makes the prosecutor bear the burden of proving the culpability of the de-
fendant. In statistical terms, the innocence of the defendant is the null hy-
pothesis the court is presented with and that the prosecutor tries to reject. The
court bases its decision upon the evidence presented by both parties and
expresses a verdict of guilty/not guilty. There thus could be false positives
or wrongful convictions of innocents and false negatives or wrongful acquit-
tals of guilty individuals. Achieving greater accuracy implies the reduction
of both types of errors, while not convicting innocents means decreasing
only false positives. These two goals are partly conflicting. There is no
doubt, however, that most modern legal systems seem to all have the same
strong concern with respect to the possible wrongful conviction of an inno-
cent prevailing over the apprehension of a guilty that might in the end escape
a due conviction. In order for the first concern to prevail, the criminal pro-
cedure can be tilted toward the interests of the defendant in a variety of ways.
These encompass, among others, the high level of evidence necessary to
5. Although in diverse guises, it is present in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Article 11) and in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms of the Council of Europe (Article 6.2).
6. It is a well-established principle of countries of common law tradition such as the
United States (see Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895)) or Canada (see Section
11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
7. There is a tendency to consider the presumption of innocence as a feature that best
fits the adversarial system of common law countries rather than the inquisitorial system of
civil law countries (O’Reilly, 1994). However, this is not necessarily the case; see for
instance, Ingraham (1996). The presumption of innocence is, for instance, clearly
remarked in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (Article
9) that has constitutional value and in Article 27 of the Italian constitution.
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convict,8 the set of rights which the defendant is entitled to (such as the right
to silence) or asymmetric appeal rights that impede the prosecutor to appeal
an acquittal at trial, and finally the set of duties imposed on the prosecutor
such as mandatory disclosure of evidence.
In general terms, mandatory disclosure forces the parties to reveal infor-
mation in their possession upon the request of the counterpart. In criminal
procedure, mandatory disclosure is thus a pro-defendant safeguard in so far
as it supports the emergence of exculpatory evidence. In the United States,
mandatory disclosure descends from the due-process requirements embed-
ded in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. After Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963), which made the disclosure of exculpatory evidence
in favor of the defendant compulsory for the prosecutor, the failure of pros-
ecutors to fully disclose information has led to the upholding of countless
cases (Gershman, 2006) and the so-called Brady rule has been codified in
both prosecutorial guidelines and incorporated into an explicit ethical duty
upon government attorneys (American Bar Association, 1993). More bind-
ing and enforceable rules to constrain prosecutorial behavior have in the
meanwhile been advocated (Kurcias, 2000; Green, 2003). The intent of
8. Different burdens of proof imply different thresholds of rejections of the null
hypothesis. It is safe to argue that the higher the standard required—all else being equal—
the more difficult it is to achieve a conviction and hence the lower the number of innocents
convicted (false positives) and the higher the number of guilty individuals acquitted (false
negatives). In civil cases (where the standard of preponderance of evidence applies), the
plaintiff must show that her claims are ‘‘more likely than not’’ true. Conversely, in order to
obtain a criminal conviction, the prosecutor must convince the judge beyond any reason-
able doubt. The law and economics literature on the standard of proof is extensive and
takes different routes. One first venue is the determination of the optimal standard of proof.
Some authors model the standard that minimizes the social costs of judicial errors with
exogenous false-positive and false-negative costs (Miceli, 1991; Yilankaya, 2002). Others
derive the optimal standard from litigation expenditures (Hay and Spier, 1997), litigation
expenditures vis-à-vis error costs (Rubinfeld and Sappington, 1987), the fact-finding tech-
nology (Sanchirico, 1997), and the optimal exertion of care by parties (Demougin and
Fluet, 2006). Another stream of literature addresses parties’ incentives to disclose evi-
dence; see Milgrom and Roberts (1986) discussing sufficient conditions for full revelation
by parties and optimal strategies for decision makers; Shavell (1989) discussing optimal
sanctions to trigger revelation of evidence to courts; Shin (1998) arguing the superiority of
the adversarial systems as a mechanism of evidence revelation by the parties; Cooter and
Emons (2003, 2004) showing that perjury is an imperfect truth-revealing mechanism used
to force the disclosure of evidence and suggesting more efficient mechanisms based on
strict liability and bond-posting of witnesses.
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Brady was to compel prosecutors to their constitutional mandate of guaran-
teeing the defendant a due process.9
Law and economics scholars have shown how mandatory disclosure
smoothens the discovery process, increments the rate of settlements, and
reduces transaction costs (for a general overview, see Cooter and Rubinfeld,
1994) and agency costs in particular (Mahoney, 1995). On the other hand, it
has been shown that mandatory disclosure may have an ambiguous effect on
convictions if not coupled with the right to silence.10 This is because if, on
the one hand, mandatory disclosure tends to reduce convictions directly as
more exculpatory evidence is produced, on the other hand, it tends to in-
crease convictions indirectly by worsening the jury’s adverse inference from
the defense’s silence. Under mandatory disclosure, assuming that the defen-
dant has better information on the case, the jury may be less inclined to be-
lieve that the defendant remains silent because she does not know the
evidence and more likely to believe that the defendant keeps her mouth shut
because the evidence is incriminating.11
9. Although the obligation to disclose has constrained prosecutors discretion, it has
arguably failed to align their incentives with the societal pursuit of fair trials if it is true that
prosecutorial suppression of evidence has accounted for 16–19% of reversible errors of
death-penalty sentences between 1973 and 1995, according to Gelman et al. (2004), and
that, according to Bedau and Radelet (1987), one in 10 of 350 wrongful death-sentence
convictions held between 1900 and 1985 were the result of prosecutorial suppression of
evidence.
10. The right to remain silent is another cornerstone of criminal procedure in com-
mon law countries. Noticeably, the right to silence was withdrawn in Northern Ireland in
1988 and England in 1994 in order to facilitate the conviction of suspected terrorists
(Mialon, 2005). In the United States, it derives from the Fifth Amendment. After Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the right to silence, on the one hand, recognizes the
right of the defendant to not self-incriminate (witnesses may instead be held liable if they
refuse testimony) and, on the other hand, it prevents the jury from inferring any conclusion
from the defendant’s silence. See Seidmann and Stein (2000) and Seidmann (2005).
11. Seidmann and Stein (2000) and Seidmann (2005) argue that, absent of the right
to silence, the guilty mimics the innocent and by doing so he pools with them, thus under-
mining the credibility of innocents that make exculpatory statements. This, in turn,
increases the probability that innocents are convicted wrongfully. Mialon (2005) furthers
the case for the right to silence by noting that, when evidence pertaining to culpability is
inaccurate or unknown to the defendant, she may prefer to stay silent either because the
evidence might indicate that she is guilty or because she might not know the evidence she
is charged with. In either case, the innocent defendant might be wrongfully convicted if
the adverse inference from silence is not prevented but correctly acquitted if the right to
silence is in place.
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To conclude, the Brady rule is a distinctive feature of the American crim-
inal procedure. It is an eminent aspect of procedure as it is believed to con-
stitute an important procedural safeguard for errors against innocent
defendants. Scholars have been so far divided between those emphasizing
the ‘‘false-negative’’ downside of this pro-defendant feature12 and those cel-
ebrating its merits in terms of successful restraint on prosecutorial abuses
(Hylton and Khanna, 2007). Neither side of the argument disputes the fact
that mandatory disclosure in criminal procedure works in the interests of
defendants. Our paper questions this point. We argue that this pro-defendant
mechanism, while helping defendants in general, may end up hurting the
innocents accused. In the following section, we show that, under certain con-
ditions, the innocent defendant is not well served by the Brady rule.
4. The Model
Suppose defendants facing the court are guilty with probability q and not
guilty with probability 1  q, exogenous in the model (see the following
section for further discussion). The prosecutor cannot distinguish individuals
in terms of their culpability and thus, even if the prosecutor dislikes pros-
ecuting and convicting innocents, she cannot perfectly rule out judgment
errors.
4.1. Strategy Set for the Prosecutor
A prosecutor can choose one of three prosecutorial strategies:
(1) Drop: the prosecutor decides to discontinue the case and drop all
charges;
(2) Passive: the prosecutor makes no further investigation after the
evidence is gathered by the police but pursues the case seeking
a conviction;
(3) Active: the prosecutor operates further investigation that might or
might not actually reveal the true behavior of the accused before con-
tinuing with the case.
12. That is to say the fact that it may help guilty individuals to escape conviction.
See Atkins and Rubin (2003) and Cassell and Fowles (1998).
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If no further investigation is pursued, a guilty individual is convicted with
probability pg and an innocent is convicted with probability pi (<pg).
13
However, if the prosecutor decides to be active more evidence can be
obtained. We consider two possibilities: (i) incriminating evidence and
(ii) exculpatory evidence. Notice that the results of our model are robust
to the inclusion of a third possibility, a mix of incriminating and exculpatory
evidence, or no evidence.14 For sake of exposition, we consider a simple
model with (i) and (ii) only. Table 1 summarizes the probabilities that each
type of evidence is obtained after further investigation.
The only assumption is that x < y. This simply means that, by searching
for further evidence, the prosecutor is more likely to obtain exculpatory ev-
idence when the defendant is innocent and more likely to obtain incrimina-
tory evidence when the defendant is guilty. Notice that this restriction is mild
as it does not imply that accuracy necessarily improves with further inves-
tigation since x > 0 and y < 1.
Under mandatory disclosure, the consequences of gathering more infor-
mation are the following:
(1) (AMD) Incriminatory evidence: this secures a conviction with proba-
bility one.15
(2) (BMD) Exculpatory evidence: this fully undermines prosecution and
therefore the case is dropped.
Table 1. Probabilities of Incriminatory Evidence Conditional on Type
Incriminating Exculpatory
Guilty (q) y 1  y
Innocent (1  q) x 1  x
13. These probabilities are determined by the evidence already gathered by the en-
forcement agencies and shared with the defendant. Moreover, further evidence can be
introduced later by other parties, including the defendant. In this context, a rule of man-
datory disclosure does not change these probabilities.
14. By obtaining a mix of incriminatory, exculpatory, mere circumstantial, or even
no further evidence, we should assume that the probabilities of conviction are unaltered,
hence pg and pi for the guilty and for the innocent, respectively (the decision to gather more
information has neither helped nor hurt the prosecutor).
15. This is a mere normalization. In fact, all the results of the paper would still be
valid with a probability of conviction less than one.
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Under voluntary disclosure, the consequences of gathering more infor-
mation are the following:
(1) (AVD) Incriminatory evidence: this still secures a conviction with prob-
ability one since the evidence will be voluntary disclosed.
(2) (BVD) Exculpatory evidence: now this evidence is willfully not dis-
closed any longer. However, it still affects the probabilities of convic-
tion because it might be leaked or it might affect the behavior of the
enforcement authorities who had access to the information, thus reveal-
ing the existence of such evidence. We assume that the probabilities of
conviction are altered to rg and ri for the guilty and for the innocent,
respectively; they are higher than zero (under mandatory disclosure
they are zero) but less than pg and pi, respectively.
The process of further investigation and information gathering has two
possible outcomes. It may help the prosecutor by collecting incriminatory
evidence, or it may hurt the prosecutor by collecting exculpatory evidence.
The probabilities of conviction are summarized in Table 2. A first look at
this table could tempt us to conclude that the accused, either guilty or in-
nocent, is necessarily better off under the Brady rule since the probability
of conviction decreases when exculpatory evidence is gathered and remains
constant in all other cases. However, the point of our paper is that such a na-
ive conclusion neglects the incentives provided for the prosecutor to adjust
strategies. Such an adjustment of strategies might actually hurt the innocent
accused and benefit the guilty since the prosecutor cannot distinguish indi-
vidual culpability.
4.2. Prosecutor’s Payoffs
The loss for the prosecutor from an acquittal is zero, whereas the benefit
for the prosecutor from winning depends on the nature of the defendant. A






Guilty mandatory 0 pg 1 0
Guilty voluntary 0 pg 1 rg
Innocent mandatory 0 pi 1 0
Innocent voluntary 0 pi 1 ri
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conviction of a guilty defendant provides a gain normalized to one, whereas
a conviction of an innocent defendant provides only V  1. A prosecutor
who is indifferent to the culpability of the accused and only cares about max-
imizing convictions has V¼ 1. A prosecutor who wishes to convict only the
culpable accused should have V ¼ 0.16 Notice that the prosecutor cannot
perfectly distinguish a culpable from an innocent defendant; she does not
know whether the specific defendant belongs to the q or the 1  q pool.
However, she knows the probability q and therefore she can compute her
expected payoffs.17
While dropping the case implies no cost for the prosecutor, we assume
that the passive strategy comes at a cost S, whereas the active strategy comes
at a cost C. These costs are positively correlated such that S(C) and S’(C) >
0. This is because if it is costly to pursue a certain case, it is also expensive to
operate further investigation.
In terms of payoffs, the difference between mandatory and voluntary dis-
closure of information is that when the process of gathering more informa-
tion hurts the prosecutor by uncovering exculpatory evidence, it hurts more
under mandatory than under voluntary disclosure. As we will see, another
way of interpreting this observation is that obtaining further information is
relatively more costly under mandatory than under voluntary disclosure be-
cause the prosecutor cannot hide new detrimental evidence under the former
but she can under the latter.
For the following three subsections, we assume that the prosecutor is risk
neutral. Risk aversion is addressed in the last subsection.
16. We use zero as the lower limit for convenience and without loss of generality
given the monotonicity of the expected payoffs and first derivatives as we show in the
following subsections. We also rule out the case of a sadistic prosecutor that derives utility
precisely by punishing the innocents. For such a prosecutor, V > 1.
17. Indeed if the prosecutor could perfectly discriminate, then she would opt for
dropping all cases against innocents, anticipating that the odds of eventually winning
the case when the defendant is innocent are low. If this were the case, mandatory disclo-
sure would be pointless because no innocent would risk a wrongful conviction. Con-
versely, if the prosecutor does not even know the probability q, she would simply
consider all defendants as presumably guilty and thus extract a payoff V ¼ 1 from the
conviction of each of them.
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4.3. Mandatory Disclosure and Prosecutor’s Behavior
Under mandatory disclosure, the expected payoffs of the prosecutor are as
following: (
EðpÞdropMD ¼ 0;
EðpÞpassiveMD ¼ qpg þ ð1 qÞpiV  SðCÞ;
E ðpÞactiveMD ¼ qyþ ð1 qÞxV  C  SðCÞ:
ð1Þ
With the following assumption, we consider only the case where being
active generates higher payoffs than being passive.
Assumption 1. q(y  pg) þ (1  q)(x  pi)V  0
Without this assumption the prosecutor would never be active. It should
be noticed that dropping this assumption helps our results but makes them
less convincing; hence, we opt for the more challenging scenario and impose
this restriction. Essentially, it must be the case that, by being active, it is more
likely than not that the prosecutor will find incriminating evidence.
The following proposition describes the levels of C that induce the pros-
ecutor to switch behavior among the three possible strategies.
Proposition 1. Assume that qpgþ (1 q)piV> S(q(y pg)þ (1 q)(x
pi)V).
18 The prosecutor chooses (i) drop if C > Ca; (ii) passive if Cb < C 
Ca; (iii) active if CCb, where Ca and Cb are defined in the following way:
SðCaÞ ¼ qpg þ ð1 qÞpiV ;
Cb ¼ qðy pgÞ þ ð1 qÞðx piÞV : ð2Þ
Proof. The choice between the active and passive strategy is solved by
verifying whether EðpÞpassive < EðpÞactive. The prosecutor stays active when
the costs are less than the critical value Cb.Note that Cb is positive given our
Assumption 1.19
18. Notice that qpg þ (1  q)piV > S(0) is not enough.
19. The intuition is that, if the threshold for costs Cb is negative, the prosecutor
needs to be subsidized in order to be active since the expected ‘‘gain’’ is actually negative.
Therefore, in the absence of subsidies, the prosecutor is always passive. This would make
our main result too obvious since when there is mandatory disclosure, the prosecutor is
never active, and thus the innocent defendant is always hurt.
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We now turn our attention to the possibility of dropping the case. We first
compare EðpÞdrop < EðpÞpassive. The prosecutor will choose passive over
drop if the costs are lower than the critical value Ca, the implicit definition
of which is obtained by equalizing Equation (1) to Equation (2).
Cb could in principle be higher than Ca. However, this would further
simplify the reasoning and lead to trivial and/or uninteresting results20
and therefore we have imposed that Cb < Ca. In other words,
qðy pgÞ þ ð1 pÞðx piÞV < S1ðqpg þ ð1 qÞpiVÞ;
where S1() is the inverted function of S(C). The condition announced at the
beginning of the proposition necessarily guarantees that Cb < Ca.21
Finally, we want to show that for all C  Cb, the prosecutor is better off
being active rather than dropping the case (it only makes sense for Cb > 0,
otherwise the prosecutor is never active). This follows suit from the previous
reasoning since we have shown that active is preferred to passive if C < Cb;
passive is preferred to drop if C < Ca and by construction Cb < Ca. n
We can graphically represent Proposition 1 along the line of values that
the cost of obtaining further evidence C can take, from zero to infinity, in
Figure 1.
Cases with high costs of prosecution are dropped. Cases with intermedi-
ate costs are prosecuted under a passive strategy, and finally cases with low
costs are prosecuted under an active strategy (that might result later in
Figure 1. Prosecutorial Strategies Conditional on Costs of Prosecution.
20. If Cb > Ca, then passive is never an optimal strategy. Let us start with high
costs. In that case drop is the best strategy. The first critical value to be encountered
as we go down is Cb. Now the choice is between drop and active. Either could be optimal
depending on the critical value, but passive will never emerge as a viable choice. The
results of the paper are now in terms of drop and active. We find the setup we have chosen
more general and more challenging to our thesis.
21. Since S() is increasing in C, this means that qpg þ (1  q)piV has to be large
enough, that is, the expected gain from passive must be large enough to justify not drop-
ping the case.
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conviction, acquittal, or dropping depending on the further evidence gath-
ered). Notice that we are assuming that Cb is greater than zero, following
Assumption 1. It could be otherwise, in which case the prosecutor would
never be active (the technology of further operating evidence hurts the pros-
ecutor on average and so it is never chosen).
Let us assume that the cost C is distributed according to the population of
cases, so that each case has a different cost in terms of prosecution and gath-
ering further information,22 with a probability density function g(C) and a
cumulative density function G(C) with support in [0,N). The proportion of
cases dropped is 1  G(Ca), of cases prosecuted under passive is G(Ca) 
G(Cb), and of cases prosecuted under active is G(Cb), assuming Cb is
greater than zero.
4.4. Prosecutor’s Concern with Wrongful Convictions under
Mandatory Disclosure
As argued before, the prosecutor’s goals are not aligned with the ones of
society, and while some prosecutors may seek to maximize accuracy (con-
vict guilty and acquit innocent defendants), others may simply seek to max-
imize convictions regardless of actual guilt. In mathematical terms, the
prosecutor’s concern with defendant’s culpability is represented by V. From
the definitions of Ca, it is straightforward that it goes up with V. As from the
definition of Cb, we can see that it goes up with V if x > pi and goes down
otherwise. Since x is the probability of finding incriminating evidence
against an innocent defendant, we suggest that the latter effect is more likely.
Let us start with the case that Cb goes down. As the prosecutor cares less
about wrongly convicted defendants, we will have fewer cases being drop-
ped, fewer cases being prosecuted under active, and more cases being pros-
ecuted under passive. Because additional information is informative, more
opportunistic prosecutors are more reluctant to adopt the active strategy.
Consider now the possibility that Cb goes up. The objective function of
a prosecutor who cares little of innocents wrongly convicted results in fewer
cases being dropped and more cases being prosecuted under active. The
22. Alternatively one can think of the population of prosecutors where some pros-
ecutors are highly ineffective, hence have high costs, whereas others are highly effective,
hence have low costs.
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number of cases being prosecuted under passive can go up or down, depend-
ing on the density function. Let us differentiate G(Ca) G(Cb) with respect
to V:
gðCaÞð1 qÞpi=S0ðCaÞ  gðCbÞð1 qÞðx piÞ:
In the limit case that the active strategy is never chosen, because Cb < 0,
a more selfish prosecutor results necessarily in more cases being prosecuted
under passive and fewer cases being dropped.
4.5. Voluntary Disclosure
Remember that, with voluntary disclosure, the prosecutor can withhold
exculpatory evidence to some extent, and thus the probabilities of convic-
tion, if such evidence is produced, are rg (if guilty) and ri (if innocent) and no
longer zero (see Table 2). Notice that the expected payoffs of the prosecutor
under drop and passive are unchanged. However, if she is active, we now
have a different expected payoff:
EðpÞactiveVD ¼ q½yþ ð1 yÞrg þ ð1 qÞ½xþ ð1 xÞriV  C  SðCÞ:
Assumption 2. q[y þ (1  y)rg  pg] þ (1  q)[x þ (1  x)ri  pi]V  0.
This assumption, along the lines of Assumption 1, imposes that the choice
of the active strategy generates a net expected gain to the prosecutor also
under voluntary disclosure. If this were not the case, she would never choose
active. Notice that if Assumption 1 is satisfied, Assumption 2 is also nec-
essarily satisfied.
Proposition 2. Assume that qpgþ (1 q)piV> S(q[yþ (1 y)rg pg]þ
(1 q)[xþ (1 x)ri pi]V). The prosecutor chooses (i) drop if C>Ca; (ii)
passive if Cc < C  Ca; (iii) active if C  Cc, where Ca and Cc are defined
in the following way:
SðCaÞ ¼ qpg þ ð1 qÞpiV ;
Cc ¼ q½yþ ð1 yÞrg  pg þ ð1 qÞ½xþ ð1 xÞri  piV :
Proof. Similar to Proposition 1. n
By direct comparison, we can see that Cc > Cb. The intuition is that the
technology for further gathering of information is more favorable to the
The Brady Rule May Hurt the Innocent 185
prosecutor, on average, under voluntary than under mandatory disclosure.
Naturally, this results in active being more likely under voluntary rather than
under mandatory disclosure.
We can now represent graphically Propositions 1 and 2 in Figure 2.
Cases with high costs of prosecution are dropped anyway, cases with in-
termediate high costs are prosecuted under a passive strategy anyway, and
cases with low costs are prosecuted under an active strategy anyway. How-
ever, cases with intermediate low costs are prosecuted under passive if man-
datory disclosure prevails and under active if instead voluntary disclosure is
the rule. Notice that we are assuming that Cb and Cc are greater than zero. If
it were otherwise, the cases on the left-hand side of the distribution would
progressively disappear. If active is never chosen, there is no difference
between mandatory and voluntary disclosure of information since no further
gathering of information takes place.
4.6. Prosecutor’s Concern with Wrongful Convictions under
Voluntary Disclosure
We can also investigate how the prosecutor’s concern with the culpability
of the defendant matters in terms of prosecution under both rules. We have
already shown that Ca goes up with V and Cb depends on xi being more or
less than pi. The value of Cc goes up with V if x(1  ri) > pi  ri and goes
down with V otherwise. As before, since x is the probability of finding in-
criminating evidence against an innocent defendant, we suggest that the lat-
ter effect is more likely.
It is clear that there are three possible cases: (i) both Cb and Cc go down
with V; (ii) both Cb and Cc go up with V; and (iii) Cb goes down but Cc goes
up with V. If they move in opposite directions with V, it is straightforward
that the number of cases subject to a switch of prosecutorial strategy
Figure 2. Prosecutorial Strategies Conditional on Costs of Prosecution under
Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosure.
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increases as the prosecutor becomes more opportunistic. More opportunistic
prosecutors are more reluctant to search for additional evidence if disclosure
is mandatory but are less reluctant if disclosure is voluntary.
Consider now the case when both values move in the same direction with
V. Now, the number of cases being prosecuted that are subject to a switch of
prosecutorial strategy in response to disclosure rules can go up or down,
depending on the density function. Let us differentiate G(Cc)  G(Cb) with
respect to V:
gðCcÞð1 qÞ½xþ ð1 xÞri  pi  gðCbÞð1 qÞ½x pi:
If we assume that the point-wise density is not very different, g(Cc) ¼
g(Cb), which, for example, is satisfied by the uniform distribution, it is clear
that this derivative is positive. If both values go up with V, a more selfish
prosecutor will increase the number of cases that are exposed to the adjust-
ment of prosecutorial strategy in response to disclosure rules. The opposite
happens if both values go down with V.
However, let us emphasize that even if V ¼ 0 (the prosecutor does not
benefit from the conviction of innocent defendants), there are still cases in
this interval. This is an important observation since it implies that even in
presence of a benevolent prosecutor here mandatory disclosure hurts the in-
nocent and helps the guilty (remember in fact that she cannot distinguish
guilty from innocent defendants).
4.7. Welfare of Defendants
Let us now consider the welfare of the defendants as measured by the
probability of conviction. For those cases that are always dropped or always
prosecuted under passive, nothing changes; that is, for C  Cc, there is no
relevant variation since they do not benefit from further gathering of infor-
mation. Consider now the situation for those defendants whose cases are
always prosecuted under active. They are obviously better off since they
are the ones benefiting explicitly from mandatory disclosure as summarized
in Table 2 (guilty and innocent alike). The critical group is made by those
defendants for which C is between Cb and Cc. With the following propo-
sition, we identify the conditions under which the innocents are worse
off and the defendant better off because of the adjustment of prosecutorial
strategy.
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Proposition 3. Suppose Cb  C < Cc, or equivalently, q(1  y)rg þ (1 
q)(1 x)riV> 0. Innocents are worse off under mandatory disclosure if x<
(pi  ri)/(1  ri) and guilty individuals are better off under mandatory dis-
closure if y > (pg  rg)/(1  rg).
Proof. We compare directly the expected probabilities of conviction un-
der mandatory (passive) and under voluntary disclosure (active):
pi > xþ ð1 xÞri;
pg < yþ ð1 yÞrg:
Direct computation yields the two expressionsmentioned in the proposition.
n
Let us explain why these conditions are likely to be verified. They impose
that incriminating evidence is not very likely to be found for innocent defend-
ants, whereas it is likely to be found for guilty defendants. Although the con-
ditions do not follow from previous assumptions, we suggest they are likely
to be satisfied. Proposition 3 also relies on the ability of the prosecutor to hide
some exculpatory evidence but not all under voluntary disclosure. If the pros-
ecutor is able to perfectly eliminate all exculpatory evidence, by construction,
ri ¼ pi and pg ¼ rg. Under this assumption, innocents are always better off
under mandatory disclosure since otherwise exculpatory evidence can never
be known. Consider now the opposite example. Exculpatory evidence always
becomes known if it is obtained by the prosecutor despite her effort to hide it.
In this scenario, ri¼ rg¼ 0.Mandatory and voluntary disclosures of evidence
are formally equivalent. Therefore, unsurprisingly, Cb ¼ Cc.
Table 3 summarizes the results.
Remark. Under mandatory disclosure (as compared to a voluntary disclo-
sure), (i) the guilty are better off on average; (ii) some innocents are better
Table 3. Comparison of Outcomes under Different Prosecutorial Strategies
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off (those for whom prosecutors are active); (iii) some innocents are worse
off (those matched with prosecutors that change their behavior in response to
mandatory disclosure); and (iv) if the number of cases for which prosecutors
switch strategy in response to mandatory disclosure is overwhelming (more
likely when prosecutors are selfish with V ¼ 1 and less likely when pros-
ecutors dislike convicting innocents with V¼ 0), the innocent is worse off on
average.
When the distribution of enforcement costs is such that the number of
defendants exposed to switch in Table 3 is minimal, mandatory disclosure
is welfare maximizing as suggested by the standard literature. However,
when the number of defendants exposed to switch is maximal, voluntary
disclosure is more appropriate from the perspective of the welfare of inno-
cent defendants.
4.8. Risk-Averse Prosecutors
Suppose now prosecutors are risk averse. We argue that nothing changes
substantially in the model:(
UdropMD;VD ¼ Uð0Þ; ð3Þ
UpassiveMD;VD ¼ qU½pg  SðCÞ þ ð1 qÞU½piV  SðCÞ; ð4Þ
UactiveMD ¼ qU½y C  SðCÞ þ ð1 qÞU½xV  C  SðCÞ; ð5Þ
UactiveVD ¼ qU½yþ ð1 yÞrg  C  SðCÞ
þð1 qÞU½ðxþ ð1 xÞriÞV  C  SðCÞ: ð6Þ
The equations describe standard von Neumann–Morgenstern utility func-
tions for the prosecutor under the different actions. We should start by ob-
serving that only the strategy drop described in Equation (3) (prosecutor’s
utility function in cases of drop for both mandatory disclosure and voluntary
disclosure) is risk free. Equation (4) describes prosecutor’s utility when pas-
sive. The implicit definition of Ca goes down because of the concavity of the
function. A similar reasoning can bemade forCb andCc observing Equations
(5) and (6). So a risk-averse prosecutor, all the rest being equal, would be less
likely to be passive and even less likely to be active. Mathematically, we
expect Ca, Cb, and Cc to all go down. More cases will be dropped, and fewer
cases will be prosecuted under an active strategy under both rules. However,
from our perspective, the relevant cases are the ones between Cb andCc. The
immediate observation is that these cases are likely to exist unless risk
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aversion is so significant that the active strategy is never chosen. As to the
proportion of cases, we know both interval limits go down, the question being
which goes down further. In order to answer this question, we should observe
that the active strategy is riskier under mandatory than under voluntary dis-
closure because, in the case of exculpatory evidence, the probability of con-
viction is lowest in the former, all the rest being constant. Intuitively, we
expect Cb to decrease more than Cc. With risk aversion, the interval of cases
exposed to switching of strategies is likely to widen. Therefore, the introduc-
tion of risk aversion reinforces rather than limits our main claim.
5. Legal Policy Implications
Our model explains why the Brady rulemay have a very different impact
on the welfare of the accused. Depending on which effects identified by the
model prevail, pro-defendant criminal procedure might benefit the guilty and
hurt the innocent. This has consequences not only for the quality of criminal
procedure as we have discussed in the model (false positives and false neg-
atives) but also for deterrence. From previous literature,23 we know that if
a certain rule or policy hurts the innocent and benefits the guilty (or more
generally, if a rule benefits the guilty more than the innocent), then it fosters
criminal activities. The reason is that the relative cost of violating the law is
reduced. Conversely, pro-defendant criminal procedure that helps the inno-
cent and hurts the guilty (more generally, any rule that hurts the guilty more
than the innocent) increases deterrence. In terms of deterrence, the model
suggests that mandatory disclosure induces undercompliance (because it
is likely that the guilty benefits more than the innocent due to the change
of behavior on the prosecutor’s side) under certain conditions. Naturally,
our model is based on a set of assumptions that are disputable, and therefore
they will be discussed in the next paragraphs.
5.1. Behavior of Jury and Judge
One possible objection to our results concerns their robustness to the in-
troduction of a jury or a judge that can make inferences from the evidence
23. See Png (1986) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for models in which false pos-
itives jeopardize deterrence. See further discussion in Lando (2006) and Garoupa and
Rizzolli (2010).
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that the prosecutor presents in court when the prosecutor can withhold ev-
idence (i.e., when there is no Brady rule in place).
There are two possible situations. When both the defendant and the court
are unaware of the possibility of existence of more evidence than the one
presented by the prosecution (e.g., the hidden cameras in our second exam-
ple), there is no unraveling in terms of the jury and the judge making infer-
ences. However, when the court suspects that some additional evidence
might exist but the prosecutor has decided not to pursue it, the jury and
the judge are likely to draw some inference.
Without mandatory disclosure, the jury is aware that the prosecutor might
be silent about evidence favorable for the defendant, and they will factor this
in when inferring the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The nature of the
inference the jury or the judge makes, when a prosecutor can withhold ex-
culpatory evidence, depends on the costs of false positives and false nega-
tives (Schrag and Scotchmer, 1994) and the updating mechanism (Froeb and
Kobayashi, 1996). If we operate in the framework of pure Bayesian update, it
has been shown that the exclusionary rule reduces the actual standard of
proof because the jury takes into account that relevant incriminatory evidence
might have not been presented in court (Edman, 2001). Quite straightfor-
wardly, when there is the possibility that exculpatory evidence has been with-
held by the prosecutor, a Bayesian jury should increase the standard of proof.
In terms of our model, the existence of a Bayesian jury or judge that adjusts
to the possibility of prosecutors withholding exculpatory evidence implies a
reduction in the probabilities of conviction when the prosecutor is active. Nec-
essarily, for the prosecutor the expected payoff of being active is decreased
when exculpatory evidence can be withheld. However, we think our result
is robust to this framework. If, when a prosecutor is active, her expected pay-
off is higher when disclosing exculpatory evidence than when withholding it
(due to the inference of the jury or of the judge), then she will disclose such
evidence voluntarily. Hence, at most, mandatory disclosure has no practical
effect because the prosecutor discloses information voluntarily. Clearly this
possibility seems quite unrealistic. Therefore, it is likely to be the case that the
expected payoff of the prosecutor is still higher when evidence is not dis-
closed, hence making our simple framework robust to Bayesian updates.
Our reasoning so far is based on the assumption that the court can dis-
tinguish an active from a passive prosecutor, which seems reasonable. More-
over, it will be easy for a passive prosecutor to signal her strategy and hence
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avoid the reduction in expected payoff that a pooling equilibrium would
carry for her (as noted above, a Bayesian jury observing an active strategy
may impose an higher standard of proof and consequently increase the costs
of prosecution). She only has to show that she has not invested resources in
fact discovery. Obviously, if the jury cannot distinguish active from passive,
there is less information available to support Bayesian inference, and our
model is more likely to describe the essence of what is going on.
Summing-up, our simple model captures the essential strategic effect that
resists more complex specifications. The expected payoff of the prosecutor is
higher when there is no mandatory disclosure of evidence. Hence, when ex-
culpatory evidence has to be revealed, some prosecutors will prefer to be
passive, which in turn hurts the innocent.
5.2. Standard of Proof
It is likely that a rule of mandatory disclosure interacts with the specific
standard of proof for reasons that could be different from the existence of
a Bayesian jury or judge. If the standard of proof is significantly high, the
prosecutor faces an additional incentive to search for more evidence. If so,
the chilling effect generated by mandatory disclosure is marginal since the
effective constraint faced by the prosecutor is to satisfy the beyond reason-
able doubt standard. In this context, a rule of mandatory disclosure of ev-
idence cannot hurt innocent defendants. However, if the standard of proof is
satisfied by the prosecutor with some particular evidence, the chilling effect
generated by mandatory disclosure is important since she needs no further
search to secure a conviction.
5.3. Behavior of the Prosecutor: Ethics and Codes of Conduct
Our model allows for the possibility of a remorseless prosecutor as well as
for the possibility of a prosecutor who dislikes obtaining convictions of inno-
cents (but she cannot avoid this since there is asymmetric information and
culpability cannot be perfectly identified). When prosecutors are merely op-
portunistic and do not care about the degree of culpability of defendants, the
parameter V goes up, and the number of defendants exposed to detrimental
switching of prosecutorial strategy is higher. Notice, however, that even
when prosecutors dislike convicting the innocent, the effect we have iden-
tified exists; it just happens that the number of defendants exposed to such
effect is lower but never zero.
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From the perspective of innocent defendants, it is important to reduce
prosecutorial opportunism, so as to moderate the detrimental switching
of prosecutorial strategy. Naturally, rules of ethics for prosecutors play a sig-
nificant role in this context.
5.4. Behavior of the Prosecutor: Compliance with Mandatory
Disclosure
The model presupposes that prosecutors comply with the Brady rule
whenever it applies. The reality is that prosecutors can still manage what
evidence is exculpatory and has to be disclosed and what evidence is irrel-
evant or unrelated to the charges and should not be disclosed. The decision is
likely to be more relevant for the innocent defendants than for the guilty. The
reason is that the evidence the prosecutor does not want to disclose is prob-
ably favorable to the defendant. Therefore, we should reinterpret the prob-
ability of conviction of an innocent to be zero when the favorable evidence is
disclosed as a mere normalization. Once we recognize that compliance with
mandatory disclosure is not assured because prosecutors are opportunistic,
there are questions concerning enforcement mechanisms and sanctioning.
To the extent that mandatory disclosure is to be effective, compliance should
be achieved at the lowest cost. Naturally, these costs have to be balanced
against the benefits of assuring effective mandatory disclosure.
5.5. Behavior of the Prosecutor: Evidence and Discovery
The recognition that prosecutors could engage in opportunistic behavior
raises important questions concerning evidence and discovery. As our focus is
on mandatory disclosure, in our model prosecutors can only hide evidence
(but they cannot fabricate it, e.g.). The extent to which evidence and discovery
rules can reduce the gains to the prosecutor from engaging in opportunistic
conduct is relevant; the less transparent evidence rules are, the more signif-
icant is the problem we raise. Pro-defendant criminal procedure rules might
have unintended consequences because prosecutors adjust their strategies.
Furthermore, the incentives for the prosecutor to invest less in the search
process derived from the Brady rule could have a serious impact in the shap-
ing of the available technology for criminal investigation in the long run.
Better or more advanced search technologies could not be discovered
due to lack of interest by the prosecution.
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An important positive effect of the Brady rule that should not be
neglected in the analysis is that by not improving the accuracy of criminal
investigation, it reduces the incentives for predation in the prosecutor’s of-
fice. The defendant can no longer rely on the prosecutor looking for the in-
formation because he should anticipate the prosecutor’s preference for a less
careful search. The consequences of this effect depend crucially on the be-
havior of the accused.
A related beneficial effect of the Brady rule is providing incentives to the
prosecutor to waste fewer resources. Eliminating exculpatory evidence is
socially wasteful for two reasons. First, it provides information about the
defendant. Second, it is costly to be produced. If the prosecutor is free to
discard evidence when it turns out to be exculpatory, she could engage
in a socially excessive search or production of evidence. By forcing reve-
lation of evidence, a mandatory disclosure rule reduces the social costs of
evidence production.
5.6. Behavior of the Accused
In the model, from a pure game theoretical viewpoint, the defendant is
passive. In our view, the assumption is fairly realistic and can be justified in
three different ways. The most immediate explanation is that on many occa-
sions the defendant does not know about the existence of such potentially
exculpatory evidence (only the prosecution has such information). The sec-
ond explanation relates to the fact that a high percentage of defendants are
represented by pro bono counselors or public defenders who usually are not
eager to engage in expensive and aggressive defensive strategies (Rhee,
1996; Seron et al., 2001; Sandefur, 2007). Similarly, we could have situa-
tions where the defendant’s counselor is incompetent or inept. Finally, it
could be that the defendant is aware of the existence of potentially excul-
patory evidence and his lawyer is competent, but the costs of discovery are
simply too high.
Consider the examples we discussed in the introduction. In our first ex-
ample, it could be that the defendant and the court do not know about the
existence of hidden cameras close to the scene of the crime. In the second
and third examples, we could have inept lawyers representing the defendant
or he might be unaware of the existence of complex international financial
statements (second example) or confidential documents filed with the
government (last example).
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In fact, our model essentially captures the idea of a defendant who relies
heavily on the evidence produced by the public authority and is therefore not
playing an active role in criminal litigation. The model is of a game between
the prosecutor and nature. Introducing the possibility for different strategies
for the accused makes the model more complex andmore realistic. Plausibly,
a defendant can also choose between being passive or active (trying to pro-
duce evidence to support her innocence). Depending on how the behavior of
each side determines the probability of a conviction for the guilty and for the
innocent, different game structures are possible. We could have a correlated
equilibrium (both sides are passive or both sides are active). We could also
have a game with no equilibrium in pure strategies. Although modeling the
behavior of the accused introduces more complexity, the identified effects of
mandatory disclosure for the prosecutor still exist.
Mandatory disclosure for the prosecutor, as we have seen, could make the
prosecutor more passive and therefore hurt the innocent. The reaction of the
defendant could mitigate the problem (for instance, just suppose the accused
becomes more active in gathering evidence). But this would naturally in-
crease the legal costs for an innocent defendant who has to search and dis-
cover evidence to support her innocence rather than waiting for the
prosecutor to do that.
In conclusion, a more complex model that explicitly accounts for the be-
havior of the defendant does not eliminate the problems we have identified
with mandatory disclosure. It is possible that the accused could counterbal-
ance the change of the prosecutor’s behavior and therefore mitigate the
dilemmaswe have discussed in themodel. However, suchmitigation is costly
and therefore would increase the burden borne by an innocent defendant.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the effects of mandatory disclosure of ex-
culpatory evidence, the so-called Brady rule, on the behavior of prosecutors.
We have shown that mandatory disclosure of evidence may make the pros-
ecutor act passively since she loses any informative advantage and this may
end up hurting innocent defendants. In fact, the change of behavior by the
prosecutor affects the welfare of the defendant; however, this effect is not the
same on all types of defendants and it crucially depends on whether the de-
fendant is guilty or innocent. We have argued that, under certain
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circumstances, these rules hurt the innocent and benefit the guilty. Such ob-
servation carries two important implications. By inducing changes in the
prosecutor’s behavior, mandatory disclosure could actually decrease the
quality of criminal convictions (by increasing false positives) and reduce
criminal deterrence (by increasing the net returns from crime).
We have identified the strategic role of the prosecutor as a major deter-
minant of the efficacy of pro-defendant criminal procedure rules. While pre-
vious literature has argued that full discretion on the side of the prosecutor
promotes efficiency, we take the view that it could seriously undermine the
quality of criminal justice and deterrence. The critical question is the extent
to which the goals of the prosecutor are misaligned with those of society in
general. If they are, then pro-defendant criminal procedure rules such as
mandatory disclosure could exacerbate the problem.
The extent to which the detrimental effect of the Brady rule on the wel-
fare of innocent defendants matters is inevitably an empirical question. Un-
der the conditions we have derived in the paper, if prosecutors hardly adjust
their behavior and are active most of the time, then mandatory disclosure is
welfare maximizing. However, if switching behavior is a frequent reaction
of prosecutors to disclosure rules, our article suggests that we should be
careful in assessing the merits of the Brady rule. Under very specific cir-
cumstances, voluntary disclosure is better. When designing disclosure
rules, the possibility of such specific circumstances emerging should not
be neglected.
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